

**Purpose:** To list the detailed responses from the 18 (of 54 solicited) governors who responded to the six questions in a letter sent by Chairman Ham on behalf of the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA).

**Summary:** This paper is a compilation of the 18 governors’ responses to the six questions from Chairman Ham’s letter. Their responses, presented by questions alphabetically by state, with the high-points of their responses.

**Background:** One of the most important aspects of the NCFA’s mission was to gather data and feedback about the future of the Army from senior leaders, and the 54 governors representing each state, territory, and District provided important feedback.

The NCFA was able to personally see and interact with 23 of the 54 governors in July 2015, at the semi-annual National Governors’ Association meeting held at the Greenbrier Resort, in West Virginia.

In addition, the NCFA was able to personally visit with 5 different governors during some of NCFA’s site visits.

In addition, since the July 2015 meeting, the NCFA received 18 separate governor letters. Those letters were loaded into the NCFA website for viewing.

**Enclosures 1-6:** The six separate questions and the governor responses are enclosed.

**Summary:** The 18 governors provided personable detailed responses to Chairman Ham’s letter, and these responses were invaluable in the NCFA Commissioners’ process of analyzing information for making recommendations to the President and Congress on the Future of the Army.

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**Staff Summary Assessment of each Enclosure/Question:**

**Enclosure 1 Assessment:** Reduction in Force Structure (FS) is the main concern and would impact the response to state emergencies in both time and capabilities; All governors understand the fiscal constraints today, but FS reductions in our military below 9/11 numbers is clearly dangerous and seems ill advised. Soldiers represent a willingness of its citizens to serve in the Nation’s military and keep the connection to the communities.

**Enclosure 2 Assessment:** Combat units are manpower intensive and provide great resources to the state and are a cost effective surge capacity; also ensure public support for overseas conflicts; Readiness is possible through proper resourcing; Governors believe that ARNG costs one-third of the AC; ARNG should serve as the operational

combat reserve of the Army because it provides cost effective capabilities and surge capacity for national security that supports the NMS.

**Enclosure 3 Assessment:** Number of deployments is just about right. Leadership at NGB and the state are managing it correctly. The number of deployments is challenging, but acceptable and Soldiers are stepping up to the requirement. Soldiers are committed to serving both the Nation and the state and are willing to deploy to support domestic and international missions. Governors support the increase in deployment tempo from 1:5 to 1:4. Soldiers, families, and employers will support this tempo and want to be used.

**Enclosure 4 Assessment:** RC and AC both have provided critical assets in state emergencies. Dual-Status commander provides unity of effort. EMACs are critical too. Speed is the key and the NG has responded immediately. FS reduction would affect response times and capabilities, and the NG is a well-balanced force able to meet the essential 10 missions. The Title 10 sourcing process and associated authorities to call out the AC and USAR should be seamless and a rapid response similar to the NG process.

**Enclosure 5 Assessment:** Actions taken to address short-term fiscal challenges could undermine our Nation's security and ultimately be counterproductive. Biggest challenge is resourcing the NG as an operational force. The turmoil created by uncertainty of resources makes it difficult for an organization to function effectively. The turmoil created by fiscal uncertainty is a challenge and affects training, morale, and the confidence of Soldiers in their leadership. The Army needs to leverage the NG cost effectiveness to preserve capability while reducing costs.

**Enclosure 6 Assessment:** Continue the interaction with DoD and the CoGs and discuss structure changes, budget, and resource allocation with the governors. Continue working together and allow the governors to provide input to DoD's budget and structure process. The governors appreciate the dialog to interact with the CoG and DoD at ensuring the safety and security of the states and Nation.

*The NCFA received responses from 18 state Governors. The responses are listed in state alphabetical order.*

## **Enclosure 1:**

**Question 1. If the Army moves or reduces force-structure or closes Federal and/or Army National Guard (ARNG) facilities in your state, as Governor, what concerns you the most? Loss or reduction in what capability would cause you the most concern?**

AZ: Is under-represented of Soldiers per capita; loss of AH64s is the main concern, which is unacceptable risk to our Nation; loss of combat units which are manpower intensive, affect state ARNG's ability to response to disasters; ARNG is 13% of Army budget, but 390% of total Army capability.

CO: reduction in Force Structure (FS) would impact response to state emergencies in both time and capabilities; armories are located throughout the state for quick response.

CT: ARNG is the only game in town. Loss of Engineer structure is the main concern.

DE: Any FS reduction or facility closures are a grave concern. No AC units in state.

IA: Any FS reduction or facility closures are a major concern. No AC units in state. Affect state's overall ability to respond to natural disasters.

IL: Loss of FS will impact the NG's ability to respond quickly and with enough assets. Also, AC formation is critical to the state's plan. Unique challenges with the state's infrastructure and size. Capability and capacity are equally important and the loss of either or both would be a major concern. No AH64s in the state, but if ARI is implemented, then NGB will shuffle the AVN assets in the Nation and IL may lose some of their critical AVN assets to other states for balancing.

KS: State has worked hard to build relationships between the AC and NG and its citizens. Losing FS causes the Army footprint to get smaller and less connected to the citizens it defends. All Army assets are critical to the state and the NG provides the immediate response and the AC provides the support role if needed.

MA: Any loss would be detrimental to the community-based relationship. Loss or non-modernization will affect the state's ability to respond to state disasters and thereby put its citizens at risk.

MI: A detailed planning process involving the affected states and Council of Governors (CoG) as partners before any FS (both AC and RC) is lost in the state. Sequestration has done what no enemy foreign military force could ever do to the US Armed Services.

MT: Concerned about the loss of NG units. State relies heavily on NG. Must adjust the AC and RC mix to rely more on dual use, and cost effective RC and not cut the homeland capability. Rely heavily on our rotary wing fleet.

NC: Strategically placed throughout the state to respond and any FS reduction would affect our citizens. Especially concerned for loss of any Essential 10.

NH: Closing armories and other facilities that are essential for quick state activation will lead to delayed assistance and potentially higher casualty rates and great property loss. AVN assets are relied heavily upon in the state.

SD: We have closed 6 armories in the last 4 years because of FS reductions. NG plays a critical role in response to the citizens' needs. Federal government needs to step in and help fund some of the maintenance of the armories.

TN: reduction of NG FS will have a negative effect on both its readiness and federal missions that would take years to rebuild capabilities. NG responses to emergencies are tiered and scalable and should be the same for the federal missions.

TX: state responds to several disasters and a decrease in NG FS will have a detrimental affect on homeland missions and likelihood cause loss of life and property. The loss of AC is concerning too because of the military's contributions to the national defense.

WI: All governors understand the fiscal constraints today, but reductions in FS in our military below 9/11 numbers is clearly dangerous and seems ill advised. Soldiers represent a willingness of its citizens to serve in the nation's military and keep the connection to the communities. NG FS reductions would also have huge economic impacts to the state. FS is the main concern. Readiness can be accelerated, but FS losses would take years to replenish, if they are gone forever.

WV: The army FS reductions are not right for our nation or for WV. Loss of NG FS will impact the response in the state for disasters. We must adjust the AC/RC mix to rely more on the cost-effective RC. There are no AC posts in WV. The NG provides a landing spot for AC Soldiers when they come off Active Duty.

WY: Is a large state in land mass, yet one of the smallest NG in the US. A reduction in NG FS would have a serious impact on the state. Loss of all capabilities concerns me because disaster different and requires a range of expertise. We rely heavily on AVN assets too.

## **Enclosure 2:**

### **Question 2. How important to you is the ARNG combat role? Would you accept larger ARNG forces even if that meant their readiness for short notice combat was somewhat diminished?**

AZ: Combat units are manpower intensive and provide great resources to the state; cost effective surge capacity; also ensure public support for overseas conflicts; there are not enough military life capabilities, therefore, mobilization of the reserves is feasible; readiness is possible through proper resourcing; ARNG costs one-third of the AC.

CO: cost effective surge capability; ARNG is connection to the communities for federal missions and keeps the citizens engaged; combat units are manpower intensive and operate in complex environments and needed in ARNG; ARNG represents 39% of the combat force and 13% of the budget; do need to maintain a "fight tonight" capability in a small segment of the AC; ARNG can be made ready in 90-120 days, rather than growing a force from scratch.

CT: ARNG needs to remain the combat reserve of the Army. Would not accept increased end-strength in exchange for reduced force structure.

DE: ARNG combat role ensures indispensability as an operational force.

IA: ARNG is the combat reserve of the Army and should remain that. Sec 102, T32 US Code. Half of the state's ARNG FS is combat. Need to leverage the NG's cost effectiveness and combat experience. Putting more forces in the reserve components, therefore the budget can support better equipment and a larger force.

IL: Combat training and operations provide unique leadership opportunities and are invaluable resources to the state. NG presence in the communities keeps its citizens connected to national defense and the military. Removing the NG from the combat role will remove this connection. 13% and 39% statement.

KS: Important for two main reasons; first it's the most cost-effective way to enhance the ground force and provide surge capability. Second, possessing forces which span the essential 10+1 (cyber) provides flexibility and responsiveness. NG is looking for ways to include the AC into their training plan. NG provides a surge capability to the AC and allow for some stress release.

MA: Accepting new FS would be challenging because of the age and number of facilities in the state. The NG could accept a BCT HQ in lieu of another command structure leaving.

MI: Combat units are manpower intensive and provide great resources to the state; They are a cost effective surge capacity; State partnership Program is key to the combat role

too and a tool for the Army to use against hostile nations, like Russia. 13% and 39% statement.

MT: It would be shortsighted or frankly detrimental for the Nation to reduce or eliminate the combat capabilities of the NG for two reasons. First, tremendous return on the investment of NG structure. Secondly, the Nation gets major combat capability for a fraction of the cost of AC. Opposed to any divestiture of a combat capability.

NC: The ARNG must continue to be the Combat Reserve of the US Army. Provides the surge capabilities for the Army and also meets the needs of the state with DOM OPNS. ARI runs the risk of squandering the experience and capability that currently resides with the 8 BNs of ATK AVN. AC and RC are vital to the state and the AC will have 78K Soldiers leave in the next four years and the RC is the best way to retain some of those skilled leaders.

NH: NG Soldiers have experienced more than 10 years of continuous deployments. They are stronger and more adaptable and able. I don't believe readiness will be diminished with a larger NG force.

SD: NG has served as the combat reserve for the Army for generations. It would be a huge mistake to put all the combat in the regular army. NG is the most combat effective force. Absolutely accept larger FS for readiness. 13% and 39% statement.

TN: ARNG should serve as the operational combat reserve of the Army because it provides cost effective capabilities and surge capacity for national security that supports the NMS. Combat units possess unique skill sets and are trained to operate in complex environments which are inherent in natural disasters.

TX: Strongly believe the NG should remain as the combat reserve of the Army. Thus providing for our nation in combat and also in the state with homeland response.

WI: The NG is constitutionally unique. It is a state organization under the Governor's command and control, but available to congress and the POTUS under various authorities. The combat role is critical to the Army and nation. It also provides the essential elements to the critical 10. The NG must remain an integral part of the first line defense of the US. State would accept larger FS for readiness. Readiness can be improved over time, but not lost FS. NG BDEs can move from foundational readiness to collective readiness in 50-110 days. A great hedge for our nation's national defense.

WV: It is frustrating to continue to deal with federal reductions that negatively affect readiness, when states continue to meet and often exceed their obligations. Governors need to an advocate for DoD for the appropriate level of resources, to include FTS, and readiness for state and federal missions.

WY: The ARNG combat role is critical. It is the most cost effective force, and moving it out of the Army makes the nation's military less effective. Strategic depth is reduced and the ability to rapidly expand the force is decreased. The NG's cost-effectiveness is in part

its ability to rapidly conduct post-mobilization training and to deploy. Additional FS would be accepted in the state.

### **Enclosure 3:**

#### **Question 3. Do you think the number of deployments for ARNG and Army Reserve (USAR) units in your state are too frequent, too few, or about right?**

AZ: support the CNGB's "All in" statement; ARNG wants to be operationally engaged and feel the tempo is about right; USAR is not community based and most often deploy with out-of-state units and missions.

CO: Because of current FS, deployment tempo is about right. Maintain 100% end-strength too.

CT: Guardsmen can and want to do more. They join knowing that they may deploy.

DE: Deployment timeline is about right.

IA: Soldiers want to be operationally engaged in the broad spectrum of national security and homeland defense and support.

IL: Number of deployments is just about right. Leadership at NGB and the state are managing it correctly.

KS: The number of deployments is challenging, but acceptable and Soldiers are stepping up to the requirement. Citizens' job is to support the Soldiers.

MA: Because of Force Structure, deployment tempo is about right. None of the deployments have negatively impacted the state's ability to respond and meets the state's needs.

MI: NG Soldiers want to be operationally engaged and deployments are the tool for keeping the Soldiers current in doctrine and operations.

MT: Soldiers are asked if they are deploying too often and they say "no." Soldiers don't want to be placed back on the shelf and lose operational capability.

NC: National Security Strategy will need to be reexamined if the budgets point toward "short-notice combat." The deployment tempo was about right the past 14 years and the Soldiers want to continue being used.

NH: Soldiers are committed to serving both the Nation and the state and are willing to deploy to support domestic and international missions.

SD: Governor senses that the Soldiers would welcome more deployments provided early notice.



TN: the NG can effectively manage the deployment tempo and engage in the full spectrum of national security and homeland missions.

TX: The number of deployments is manageable for the past 14 years and about right. 1:5 ratio of ARFORGEN cycle has proven manageable by the NG, families, and employers.

WI: Supports the increase in deployment tempo to 1:4 from 1:5. Soldiers, families, and employers will support this tempo and want to be used.

WV: It would be short sighted and detrimental for the Nation to reduce or eliminate the combat capabilities of the NG for two reasons. First, the nation gets a tremendous return on investment in the NG. It also achieves the Total Force Concept and the Abrams Doctrine to support our nation. Second, the nation gets a major combat capability from the NG for a fraction of the cost of AC units. ARI is not the right solution and the Army needs to retain combat capability in the NG with its AVN.

WY: Deployments are a concern to the families and Soldiers, but Soldiers who don't deploy are often disappointed. They will continue to deploy as needed.

## **Enclosure 4:**

### **Question 4. What is your assessment of the Army's (Active and Reserve) ability to provide Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) to your state? Do you feel there are gaps in response capabilities, or shortages in your essential 10 missions?**

AZ: Not concerned with ARNG to provide DSCA; reductions in ARNG would have an impact; T10 and USAR take time to activate in a state and not under the Governor's control; Feel that DoD does not treat Governors as "Essential Stakeholders;" there is a gap in Cyber Defense response in the state;

CO: NG and AC both have provided critical assets in state emergencies. Dual-Status commander provides unity of effort. EMACs are critical too. Speed is the key and the NG has responded immediately. FS reduction would affect response times and assets.

CT: State has the right mix of skills and equipment. EMACs provide security from other states and their help. Outside of "Immediate Response," use of the USAR is too cumbersome and the units are manned by Soldiers from multiple states.

DE: NG force structure covers the essential 10.

IA: No concerns about the NG doing state missions. Speed is most important and the NG is meeting that requirement. FS losses will impact response times. Using federal forces requires a Stafford Act declaration.

IL: NG is a well-balanced force able to meet the essential 10 missions. Title 10 sourcing process and associated authorities to call out the Title 10 forces should be seamless and a rapid response similar to the NG process.

KS: The state has the right mix and number of NG forces to accomplish the essential 10 + 1. It uses the DSC as the vehicle to integrate the AC and RC formations and meets the needs of the state for disasters.

MA: State does not have any gaps in the essential 10 missions.

MI: There are no gaps in the essential 10. The NG has been used extensively used for state missions and federal requirements.

MT: There are no AC posts in the state. Essential 10 are covered by the NG and help from the USAR. Cyber is becoming more of a concern.

NC: Speed of response is essential to saving lives. The NG serves as the military first-responders. NC has had several large scale natural disasters and National planned events where the NG has responded with success and speed. FS reductions in the NG would negatively impact the citizens and their safety.

NH: There are no gaps or shortages in the state to conduct civilian authorities.

SD: The NG has been activated for several state missions and meets all the requirements for the essential 10. If BCA is enacted, they would lose their MP unit, which would have a huge impact in the state.

TN: Speed of response is necessary to save lives and protect property. AC maybe available, but they cannot substitute the immediate response by the NG. Pre-existing civil-military relationships already exist with the NG. The TN NG has the right mix of forces to meet the essential 10 requirements.

TX: No concerns to do essential 10 missions by NG. Substituting AC troops for TXARNG troops will not solve any potential deficiencies created on the homeland missions. AC and RC work best together.

WI: The NG has phenomenal relationships with the community leaders and first responders. There are no shortages in the essential 10 and will use EMAC to assist and be assisted by other states.

WV: The Soldiers are committed to serving and believe the op-tempo is right. They want to be operationally engaged.

WY: Fully capable to provided defense support. However, short in responding with medical assets to a mass disaster under the essential 10.

## **Enclosure 5:**

### **Question 5. Given the current and projected fiscal constraints facing the Army, what are the biggest challenges for the Army units (Active, ARNG, USAR) in your state?**

AZ: State feels that ARI is short sided and not taking advantage of the training ranges and experience of aviation in the state; urge DoD to leverage the ARNG's cost effectiveness, training ranges, and experience.

CO: Most challenging constraint would be decreased readiness. Robust training and equipment are critical.

CT: Actions taken to address short-term fiscal challenges could undermine our Nation's security and ultimately be counterproductive.

DE: Biggest challenge is resourcing the NG as an operational force.

IA: The turmoil created by uncertainty of resources makes it difficult for an organization to function effectively.

IL: NG should never return to low level of equipment readiness or modernization. Fiscal challenges and uncertainty negatively affects Soldiers, Families, Employers, and the Nation.

KS: Worry about the political wrangling over the DoD budget forces our planners to change focus from long-term strategy to short-term expediency. There are some collaborative efforts between the AC and RC to increase depth and breadth of Soldiers training. But readiness will dip with fiscal uncertainty.

MA: Three big challenges affecting the NG. First, is lack of sufficient full-time personnel. Funded at 67% of authorized levels. This affects readiness. Second is the antiquated internet band-width. Third, slowed modernization and fielding of key equipment impacts readiness too.

MI: The turmoil created by fiscal uncertainty is a challenge and affects training, morale, and the confidence of Soldiers in their leadership. The Army needs to leverage the NG cost effectiveness to preserve capability while reducing costs.

MT: Professional Military Education funding is the number one challenge facing our Soldiers. Fiscal constraints have created uncertainty in the formations.

NC: Follow the CoG counsel and leverage the NG's cost effectiveness and vast experience to preserve greater mission capability for the Total Army.

NH: The biggest challenge is the uncertainty of resources. Look at solutions that don't impact the NG. They are the only military asset in the state.

SD: The biggest challenge is tied directly to the loss of FS. Given the dangers around the world, it would be prudent to have as many trained Army units available as possible. The NG proposal for cuts needs to be relooked at by the CSA.

TN: The turmoil created by uncertainty of resources is a challenge and affects training, morale, and the confidence of Soldiers in their senior leadership.

TX: Consequences of Congressional budget uncertainty and sequestration outcomes is felt throughout the force. This has a direct impact on Soldiers, training, planning, and readiness.

WI: Unpredictability caused by both sequestration and the Army's intent to make cuts to NG are the biggest concerns. Stability and rotational readiness are a compelling argument to ensure national defense. Second concern is programmed cuts to FTS. FTS is used for foundational readiness in the NG. Future reduction in FS is ill advised.

WV: Any reduction in NG FS will have a major affect on the state. WV has key infrastructure in the state that support higher critical infrastructure for the nation. Currently all the essential 10 are being met. Uncertainty is the most significant long-term challenge in the fiscal environment for past in the future. All the more reason to leverage the NG to maintain an Army capability.

WY: The ARNG is manned at a level below the minimum required for a strategic reserve pursuant to a 1999 study. The current FT force is overworked and I'm concerned about pending cuts and the effects of the cuts to generate readiness.

## **Enclosure 6:**

### **Question 6. Do you have any recommendations for improving the Council of Governors/Department of Defense meetings?**

AZ: DoD should adhere to the law and present issues to the Governors prior to congressional submission; DSCA and homeland defense treated as real DoD priorities and involve the Governors in the decision processes; like to see the Southwest Border mission and Counter-Narco/Terrorism mission taken more seriously by DoD and increase funding or switch funding to DoHS; divestiture of AH64s is the main concern and would have detrimental effects on state; no strategic depth with AH64s all in the AC; AZ is the WAATS location and has a large training range.

CO: DoD should adhere to the law and present their issues to the Governors prior to presenting to Congress.

CT: Every year the Governor has been a member of the council, it has been at odds with DoD over the disposition of the NG. The Governors and Council can be key advocates for DoD if they work together.

DE: DoD needs to participate fully in the law.

IA: The Governor served four years as Co-Chair for the council and seeing improvements between DoD and Governors. DoD to continue adhering to federal law.

IL: DoD needs to adhere to Federal law and take advantage of the Governor's support.

KS: It would be helpful if Governors were allowed to comment on Force Structure changes and key military decisions involving the AC and RC formations in their state. Building ties with the Governors will help DoD with Congress and the POTUS.

MA: DoD should make the CoG part of the budget and policy formulations process throughout the year, and not just an information brief by dialog and collaboration.

MI: Serving on the CoG has been beneficial and the dialog is getting better between all parties. The additional phone calls in-between meetings have helped too.

MT: DoD needs to participate fully in the law and allow greater input from the Governors.

NC: Continue the discussions with DoD and the CoGs and discuss structure changes, budget, and resource allocation with the Governors.

NH: Work more closely with the Governors.

SD: DoD should adhere to federal law and meet with Governors before Congress.

TN: Continue working together and allow the Governors to provide input to DoD's budget and structure process.

TX: Engage in robust dialogue on NG issues with the Governors and DoD.

WI: The governor appreciates the counsel to interact with the CoG and DoD at ensuring the safety and security of the state and nation.

WV: Continue working together and allow the Governors to provide input to DoD's budget and structure process.

WY: The Governors and CoG have worked together to establish a cooperative and substantive framework for decisions. However, DoD could do better at consulting the CoG. Need to improve this process.